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Executive Summary
The rarity of changes to the Supreme Court’s structure and procedures is undoubtedly a source
of stability and legitimacy. We advance recommendations in this report for reforms to the
Court as part of an ongoing dialogue about how reform might strengthen the institution. We
recognize that maintaining the Court in substantially the same form may outweigh potential
benefits of reform.
The Constitution’s framers created the Supreme Court with a core principle in mind:
independence. Over its history, the Court has faced threats to its independence from politics,
especially in the public’s eyes. An irregular appointment system has given some presidents
more opportunities to nominate justices to the Court, and the Senate confirmation process has
often been politicized. It has appeared to observers that some justices have timed their
retirements to allow presidents of certain political parties appoint their replacements. Another
perception is that ideological voting blocks have often decided politically charged cases. And
“swing justices,” who frequently cast deciding votes, can appear to exert disproportionate
influence over issues of great importance.
Sustaining the independence of the Court is crucial to effectuating conformity with the rule of
law. This report deals with this sensitive subject by surveying the history of the Supreme Court,
identifying issues that raise concerns about the Court’s independence, and analyzing reform
proposals offered by scholars and experts. We conclude by advancing and discussing proposals
that we believe are worthy of consideration, mindful at the same time that no changes might
be the best option, especially in an era of extreme partisanship.

I. History
The Constitution’s framers did not invent the concept of judicial independence. They drew on
the work of intellectuals who emphasized its importance. Montesquieu, for instance, argued
that individual liberty and an independent judiciary were directly correlated. The development
of judicial independence in England and the colonies provided examples for the framers to
draw on. English kings appointed and removed judges at will until Parliament created
protections to give judges at least some protection from the king’s control. The king’s ability to
dismiss colonial judge was cited by the Declaration of Independence as a source of tyranny.
After the colonies declared independence, some state constitutions granted judges lifetime
tenure as a way to bolster independence.
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At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the framers conferred life tenure to Supreme Court
justices, among several other measures to protect the judiciary. The Constitution also
prevented justices’ salaries from being decreased to reduce the risk of improper influence. To
prevent Congress from having too much say over the Court, they gave the appointment power
to the president—while still requiring the Senate’s advice and consent to check the president.
And they established standardized impeachment criteria: treason, bribery, or “other high
crimes and misdemeanors.” These criteria ensured some objectivity for potential proceedings
and helped prevent arbitrary removals. This goal was also served by the requirement that
judges be impeached by a majority of the House of Representative and removed by a twothirds vote in the Senate. Finally, the framers declined to give the Supreme Court a role in the
legislative process through “revisionary power,” which could have allowed the Court to
invalidate legislation before litigants filed suit to challenge it.
Aside from these measures, the framers placed very few conditions on the Supreme Court’s
operations and its justices, instead empowering Congress to fill the gaps, such as the number of
justices on the Court and the procedural rules in the Senate for handling nominations.
In the centuries that have followed the Constitutional Convention, the Court’s role has changed
dramatically. This shift is the result of both Chief Justice John Marshall’s legitimization of
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison and numerous laws that altered the federal judiciary’s
form and functioning. But the Court’s size has not changed since 1869.

II. Existing Reform Proposals
Before advancing our proposal, we survey existing proposals for reforming the Supreme Court.
Some of those proposals touch on the lengths of justices’ tenures on the Court, such as
imposing term limits for justices or imposing a mandatory retirement age. Other proposals
would expand the number of justices on the Court. The most straightforward of these proposals
involve increasing the number of justices to a set number, with all justices deciding every case.
A more complex approach is the “balanced bench” proposal, which would increase the number
of justices to 15 and allow ten justices who identify with a political party—five from each major
party—to choose five “non-partisan” justices to serve for year-long terms. At least two
proposals involve rotating panels deciding cases. The “Supreme Court Lottery” proposal
involves randomly choosing a panel of nine from all of the federal appeals court judges in the
country. Another proposal would guarantee presidents the opportunity to appoint three
justices to the Court for every four-year term that they serve, which would expand the Court to
about 15 justices who would decide cases on panels of nine justices. Although we do not
endorse the entirety of any of these proposals, we do draw on aspects of some of them for our
proposal.
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III. Our Proposal
Our three-part recommendation addresses issues facing the Court in three areas: the
nomination process, the justices’ time on the Court, and justices’ retirement from the Court.

Securing a Senate Hearing and Vote
We propose changes to the nomination process that would essentially guarantee every
Supreme Court nominee a Senate hearing. Senate rules should require the vice president, the
Senate majority leader, and the Senate minority leader to vote on whether a presidential
nominee should receive a hearing. In almost every scenario, the nominee would receive at least
two of the three votes, given that the vice president and one of the two Senate leaders are
members of the president’s political party. With this triumvirate framework, we hope to
expedite the nomination process and ensure that nominees can at least receive due
consideration, even in times of divided government. This recommendation aims to reduce the
escalating partisan influence that Congress has had on the Court.

Implementing a Rotating Panel
We recommend allowing every president to nominate two justices for each four-year term that
he or she serves. Guaranteed appointments would expand the size of the Court beyond its
current composition of nine justices. But, under our proposal, a rotating panel of nine justices
drawn by lottery would decide each case. Allowing presidents to appoint at least two justices
per presidential term would address the inequity of appointments among presidents. Although
the president would still be required to exercise the appointment power with the Senate’s
advice and consent, we believe that regularizing appointments would decrease the gravity, and
the related partisan struggle, of each appointment.
Each panel’s decision would be entitled to stare decisis effect. To ensure stability in the law, if a
panel sought to overturn precedent, an en banc review of the decision would take place. We
also offer procedural recommendations pertaining to granting certiorari. Under our proposal,
the Supreme Court would operate more like the federal appeals courts.

Retirement
Congress should enact a law creating senior-status for Supreme Court justices allowing them to
advise sitting justices on cases before the Court. We believe that affording justices this
opportunity, coupled with an increase in the Court’s size by way of the rotating panel system,
would rectify concerns about aging justices’ health and reduce incentives for justices to time
their retirements to allow presidents of certain parties to appoint their replacements. In
addition, allowing justices to step down and assume an advisory role for the current Court
would make the most of their accumulated experience and knowledge.
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Introduction
For the Supreme Court to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the public, it must remain
independent from the executive and legislative branches and the inevitable partisanship that is
a feature of those branches. Indeed, judicial independence involves ensuring “justice will not be
a servant of the political process or subject to the whims and prejudices of the moment.”1
Although the Supreme Court interacts with the political branches of the government, it cannot
answer to them. The Court’s legitimacy is harmed by even the perception that the Court is not
above politics.
Some argue that the public’s confidence in the Court is at risk of declining,2 coinciding with its
expanding role in deciding hot-button issues along partisan lines.3 Other developments that
might contribute to a drop in confidence include unequal opportunities for presidents to
appoint justices, an increasingly antagonistic and divisive nomination process, and justices’
reluctance to retire until a president of the party that nominated them is in office.4 Each of
these circumstances threatens the Court’s legitimacy.
This report addresses how to preserve the public’s perception of the Court’s legitimacy by
suggesting reforms to safeguard the Court’s independence. Part I focuses on the Court’s
history: it highlights the monarchical abuses in both England and the American colonies that
illustrate the need for judicial independence, gives an overview of the Court’s development at
the Constitutional Convention, and describes the Court today. Part II discusses threats to the
Court’s legitimacy and the reasons why reform is necessary. Part III evaluates the strengths and
weaknesses of various existing proposals to reform the Court. Finally, Part IV recommends an
original solution that institutes: a new process in the Senate that would virtually guarantee
Supreme Court nominees receive hearings; a rotating panel for the Supreme Court itself; and
senior status for justices.

1

John D. Feerick, Judicial Independence and the Impartial Administration of Justice, 51 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 233,
236 (1996) [hereinafter Feerick, Judicial Independence].
2
Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L. J. 148, 150-51 (2019).
3
See Carl Huse, Political Polarization Takes Hold of the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/us/politics/political-polarization-supreme-court.html.
4
See Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr., Saving the Supreme Court, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 13, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/saving-supreme-court.
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I. The American Judiciary: A History of Independence
An independent judiciary has been “one of the hallmarks of the American system of
government” for over 200 years.5 However, this tenet of American government predates even
the nation’s early days.6 Influential European intellectuals recognized its value during the 17th
and 18th centuries, and England’s Parliament passed laws aimed at allowing judges more
freedom in the face of the Crown’s overreach.7 Before the Constitutional Convention in 1787,
different state constitutions incorporated provisions that emphasized judicial independence.8
At the Convention, the framers ultimately included similar language in the United States
Constitution.9 Finally, the development of judicial review and the enactment of legislation that
has defined the federal judiciary’s structure and functioning have further solidified judicial
independence as a bedrock of American government.10

The English Crown and Philosophical Roots of Judicial Independence
Judicial independence, a vital aspect of representative government that safeguards individual
rights and diminishes improper influence over the people, has roots dating back centuries.
Montesquieu’s “Spirit of the Laws,” which appeared in 1748 and influenced the Constitution’s
framers, emphasized distinct separation, declaring that “there is no liberty, if the judiciary
power be not separate from the legislative and executive.”11 In 1765, Sir William Blackstone too
stressed independence and warned that a judiciary’s dependence on another branch would
place a person’s “life, liberty, and property . . . in the hands of arbitrary judges whose decisions
would be regulated only by their opinion, and not by any fundamental principles of law.”12
Despite these contemporary views, the monarch both appointed and removed judges at his
pleasure.13 In 1701, Parliament passed the Act of Settlement, which gave the English judiciary
more autonomy by creating set salaries and establishing that judges would serve for as long as
they maintained “good behavior.”14 This prevented the king from removing judges at will and,

5

Feerick, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 236.
Id.
7
See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *268 (George Sharswood ed., 1753).
8
See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780; N.Y. CONST. of 1777.
9
See generally MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
10
See infra Part I.D.
11
Sam J. Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108, 108-09 (1970).
12
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 269 (George Sharswood ed., 1753).
13
John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 10
(1970) [hereinafter Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges].
14
Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6
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effectively, transferred the removal power to Parliament.15 However, the Act had no true force
until 1787.16
When a “good behavior” standard dictates judicial tenure, retaining an impeachment
mechanism bolsters judicial independence. In essence, it operates as a two-pronged tool that
provides a check on the judiciary, while preventing judges from being removed simply because
political actors disagree with their decisions.
Another English common law practice that influenced the framers’ desire for an independent
judiciary was the use of bills of attainder, which allowed Parliament to pass legislative acts to
punish named persons or groups without a trial.17 Attainder rendered individuals effectively
“dead in law,” barring them from receiving an inheritance, requiring them to forfeit their
property, and causing them to become “stained” in the eyes of society as if they “had never
been born.”18 Used as early as the 14th century to take possession of estates of deceased rebels,
bills of attainder allowed Parliament and the Crown to remove political enemies without the
difficulty of providing enough proof of a crime to convict them in court.19 During the
Revolutionary War, all 13 American colonies adopted bills of attainder to punish those who
remained loyal to the Crown by banishing them, confiscating their property, or even sentencing
them to death.20 However, two clauses in the Constitution barred bills of attainder at the state
and federal level.21 This prohibition suggests that the framers saw bills of attainder as a
legislature’s improper exercise of a judicial function and, therefore, outlawed them to enhance
the judiciary’s independent role and maintain separation of powers.22

Development of the Judiciary in Colonial America
Judges in colonial America served at the pleasure of royal governors.23 Before 1776, colonial
judges received commissions directly from the Crown or through royal governors under
authority from a document called the “instructions.”24 To prevent arbitrary removal of judges,
the instructions prohibited governors from expressing “any limitation of time” upon the

15

Id.
Id. at 12.
17
Charles H. Wilson, Jr., The Supreme Court’s Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
212, 213 (1966).
18
Id. at 213-14.
19
Id. at 214-15.
20
Id. at 216.
21
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . . .”).
22
See Wilson, supra note 17, at 216-17.
23
Ervin, supra note 11, at 112.
24
Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges, supra note 13, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16
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commissioned judges.25 Because it was unclear whether the duration of judges’ tenures would
be subject to the king’s pleasure or during good behavior, governors construed the condition to
be at the Crown’s will.26 In response, England issued a new order in 1752 clarifying that a
judge’s tenure was at “the pleasure of the Crown.”27 This led to strife between the Crown and
the colonies that continued until the American Revolution. In fact, the Declaration of
Independence asserted that the king bolstered judicial insecurity to instill tyranny over his
subjects.28
The colonists long sought to have judicial tenure based upon good behavior—not the
executive’s pleasure—to ensure judicial independence.29 This desire is reflected in state
constitutions written between 1776 and 1787, which provided for the impeachment of
government officials, including judges.30 These constitutions had different impeachment
procedures,31 but maladministration and misdemeanors were standard grounds for
impeachment.32 Moreover, early state constitutions specified judges’ tenure and compensation
to minimize the executive and legislative branches’ ability to influence the judiciary, and, in
turn, guarded the rule of law from becoming susceptible to the political process or prevailing
attitudes at a given time.33
For example, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 highlighted that impartially interpreting
laws and administering justice were integral to protecting individual rights, declaring that every
citizen had a right to be tried by “judges [who are] as free, impartial and independent as the lot
of humanity will admit.”34 As a result, Massachusetts judges held office “as long as they
behave[d] themselves well,” and could not serve dual appointments.35 The governor, with the
advice and consent of the Council, appointed judicial officers.36 Meanwhile, the Senate had the
power to hear and determine all impeachments made by the House.37
The New York Constitution of 1777 reiterated the Declaration of Independence’s grievances
regarding the Crown’s influence on the judiciary. It protested that the king hindered justice “by
refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers” and “made judges dependent on

25

Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Ervin, supra note 11, at 112.
30
Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges, supra note 13, at 14.
31
For example, some states barred the executive from pardoning impeached officials. Id. at 15.
32
Id. at 14. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. (1776); PA. CONST. (1776); VA. CONST. (1776).
33
See Ervin, supra note 11, at 113; Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges, supra note 13, at 14.
34
Ervin, supra note 11, at 113 (quoting MASS. CONST. (1780)).
35
Id. at 113-14.
36
MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, § 1 (1780).
37
Id. at pt. 2, ch. I, § 2.
26
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his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.”38
Accordingly, the New York Constitution declared such acts inconsistent with the public good.39
Similar to the Massachusetts Constitution, the New York Constitution established judicial terms
during good behavior.40 Unlike the Massachusetts Constitution, it added a condition that
required judges to retire at 60 years old, rather than allowing lifetime tenure.41 It prohibited
judges from holding other positions in government except for special occasions, and allowed for
impeachment of public officials through a process that gave the judiciary a relatively minor
role.42

The Constitutional Convention’s Focus on an Independent Judiciary
At the Constitutional Convention in the summer of 1787, the framers considered creating a
national judiciary from the outset of their work.43 On May 29, Edmund Randolph presented the
Virginia Plan, which called for distinct legislative, judicial, and executive branches.44 The framers
focused more attention on the legislative and executive branches than the judicial branch, but
they recognized the importance of an independent judiciary and undertook measures to ensure
that the Constitution provided for it.45 For example, the Virginia Plan proposed that the
judiciary would “consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be
chosen by the National Legislature.”46 Judges would “hold their offices during good behaviour”
and receive “fixed compensation for their services.”47
Lifetime tenure48 and fixed compensation49 were ultimately included in the Constitution to
protect judicial independence. The framers also granted the appointment power to the
executive, barred the judiciary from exercising lawmaking powers, and protected judges from
targeted impeachments.

38

N.Y. CONST. of 1777. See also HERBERT FRIEDENWALD, DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: AN INTERPRETATION AND AN ANALYSIS
230-33 (1904).
39
N.Y. CONST. of 1777.
40
Id. art. XXIV.
41
Id.
42
Id. art. XXV.
43
1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
44
Id.
45
Feerick, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 237.
46
1 FARRAND, supra note 43, at 21.
47
Id. at 21-22.
48
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
49
Id.
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1. Assigning the Appointment Power
On June 5, the Committee of the Whole discussed the process for appointing the judges of the
national judiciary.50 James Wilson of Pennsylvania opposed judicial appointments by the
legislature, and instead argued that the executive, as a single individual, should have the
power.51 He argued that allowing the legislature to appoint judges would result in “intrigue,
partiality, and concealment.”52 James Madison of Virginia wanted the Senate to appoint judges,
viewing it as a middle ground between granting the power to the full legislature and vesting it
in the executive.53
On June 15, New Jersey’s William Patterson proposed the New Jersey Plan, which, like the
Virginia Plan, called for a national judiciary.54 While it remained mostly consistent with the
Virginia Plan’s impeachment provisions, the New Jersey Plan endowed the executive—not the
legislature—with the power to appoint the “supreme tribunal” of judges.55 Additionally,
Patterson’s proposal explicitly provided that the members of the judiciary should be prohibited
from “receiving or holding any other office or appointment” during their time as judges.56
The Committee of Eleven, which convened on September 4, compiled a report that gave the
president the power to nominate “Judges of the supreme Court” with “the advice and consent
of the Senate.”57 Pennsylvania’s Gouverneur Morris observed, “[A]s the President was to
nominate, there would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be
security.”58 The delegates adopted the Committee of Eleven’s language for inclusion in the
Constitution, settling on a delicate balance where neither the president nor the Senate would
exert too much influence on the judiciary.59
2. Excluding the Judiciary from Lawmaking
On June 6, the delegates debated allowing the judiciary a revisionary role in the lawmaking
process, which would allow the judiciary to potentially intrude on lawmakers’ powers and
invalidate legislation without it first being challenged by a lawsuit.60 After some consideration,
the delegates rejected granting the judiciary this power.61 Madison cited two objections that

50

1 FARRAND, supra note 43, at 119.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 120.
54
Id. at 241.
55
Id. at 244.
56
Id.
57
2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 495 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
58
Id. at 539.
59
Id. at 539-40.
60
1 FARRAND, supra note 43, at 138-40.
61
Id. at 140.
51
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emphasized the importance of judicial independence: first, that judges “ought not to be subject
to the bias” that could arise from both making the law and subsequently deciding questions of
law62 and, second, that the judiciary “ought to be separate [and] distinct” from the other
branches of government.63
Responding to a renewed motion to grant the judiciary revisionary power, Maryland’s Luther
Martin stated that linking the judiciary and executive in this manner constituted a “dangerous
innovation,” and further stressed that the judiciary would lose “the confidence of the people” if
allowed to participate in the executive’s revisionary duties.64 Again, the delegates voted to
restrict the power to the executive, upholding the independence of the judiciary.65
3. Determining the Proper Removal Mechanism
Later in the Convention, the delegates debated the appropriate procedure for removing
Supreme Court justices.66 Delaware’s John Dickinson proposed that judges would serve during
good behavior “provided that they may be removed by the Executive” following an application
by both the Senate and House of Representatives.67 His motion was met with strong
opposition. Gouverneur Morris thought it was inappropriate for “so arbitrary an authority” to
have an enormous impact on the judiciary. Wilson also voiced opposition, asserting that the
judiciary “would be in a bad situation if made to depend on every gust of faction which might
prevail” in the executive and the legislature.68 By a vote of seven states to one, the delegates
rejected Dickinson’s motion, instead favoring a more independent judiciary.69
The convention passed a motion on September 8 setting the criteria for impeachment to
include treason, bribery, and “other high crimes and misdemeanors.”70 By standardizing the
impeachment process for judges, the framers accentuated judicial independence in the
Constitution.71

62

Id. at 138.
Id.
64
2 FARRAND, supra note 57, at 76.
65
Id. at 80.
66
Id. at 428-29.
67
Id. at 428.
68
Id. at 428-29.
69
Id. at 429.
70
Id. at 545.
71
The framers also opted to keep the judiciary out of conducting impeachment proceedings, further protecting
evenhandedness and independence. Gouverneur Morris asserted that if the executive appointed the judges to the
national judiciary, it would be improper for those judges to conduct the executive’s impeachment trial, as “an
impartial trial would be frustrated.” Id. at 42. They instead conferred this responsibility upon the Senate. Id. at 495.
63
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4. Reinforcing an Independent Judiciary
On the heels of the Convention, the framers promoted the Constitution’s ratification in the
states by explaining the document’s provisions. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton
described the standard of good behavior for federal judges as the “best expedient which can be
devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the
laws.”72 Additionally, Hamilton dismissed talk of a provision dealing with the removal of judges
for inability, arguing that it would more often than not “give scope to personal and party
attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public good.”73 With both
assertions, Hamilton promoted judicial independence as one of the Constitution’s core
principles.

Post-Constitutional Convention to the Present
In the Supreme Court’s nascent years, the judicial branch was not held in nearly the same level
of high regard as it is today.74 In fact, some of the justices appointed to the bench viewed their
position with disdain and served short tenures, partly because the Court embraced its “feeble”
design and because the pay did not entice practicing attorneys to leave their positions.75
Nonetheless, as the federal government grew, so too did the Court’s role and power.76
1. Development of Judicial Review
The development and implementation of judicial review77 increased both the Court’s power
and its independence from the political branches. Much of the Court’s increase in power can be
traced back to Chief Justice John Marshall’s 34-year tenure on the Court, and, in particular, his
efforts to legitimize judicial review.78 Marshall’s impact is remarkable because he ascended to
the bench at a time when many considered the judicial branch to be subordinate—rather than
equal—to the executive and legislative branches.79

72

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
74
See Schwarz, supra note 4.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
“Judicial review is the idea, fundamental to the US system of government, that the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of government are subject to review and possible invalidation by the judiciary. Judicial review
allows the Supreme Court to take an active role in ensuring that the other branches of government abide by the
constitution.” Judicial Review, LEGAL INFO. INST. (June 10, 2019), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/judicial_review.
78
See Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall and the Course of American Constitutional History, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 743, 744-45 (2000).
79
See id. at 745.
73
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Within Marshall’s first years as chief justice, President Thomas Jefferson and the DemocraticRepublicans took steps to reduce the judiciary’s power by repealing the Judiciary Act of 1801.80
This move prevented a decrease in the Court’s size from six to five justices.81 The DemocraticRepublicans also sought to use impeachment as a political tool to remove Federalist judges and
replace them with Democratic-Republican judges.82
In spite of these challenges, Marshall safeguarded the Court’s independence by refusing to
concede to the surrounding political pressure.83 Marshall’s most important assertion of the
Court’s independence and authority came in the decision in Marbury v. Madison.84 Marshall’s
opinion affirmed the Court’s power as the final arbiter in reviewing the constitutionality of
federal laws.85 Ultimately, the Marbury decision echoed—and perhaps answered—the
rhetorical question that Marshall posited at the 1788 Virginia Convention on the Constitution’s
ratification: “To what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the
Constitution, if you will not give the power to the Judiciary?”86
2. Fluctuations in the Size of the Supreme Court
Article III of the Constitution does not address the Court’s composition, leaving it up to
Congress to set the Court’s size.87 The Judiciary Act of 1789 established that the first Supreme
Court would consist of six justices,88 three fewer than the Court’s current composition.89 This
difference is the result of various efforts throughout the past two centuries to alter the number
of justices on the Court.90 Political scientist J.R. Saylor argues these changes were largely
political, in that Congress changed the Court’s size to exclude “justices making decisions
objectionable to an incumbent of the White House or to a dominant party majority in
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Congress” or to “‘pack’ the Court in order that the policies of the government in power would
be upheld as constitutional.”91
The first change came through the Judiciary Act of 1801,92 which Congress enacted to limit
President Jefferson’s ability to appoint justices upon taking office by reducing the size of the
Court from six to five justices.93 However, the Judiciary Act of 1802 restored the Court’s size to
six justices.94 Next, the Seventh Circuit Act of 1807 increased the Court’s size to seven justices
and created the Seventh Circuit;95 the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Acts of 1837 enlarged the Court
to nine justices and produced the Eighth and Ninth Circuits;96 and the Tenth Circuit Act of 1863
increased the number of justices to ten and established the Tenth Circuit.97
Following President Abraham Lincoln’s assassination, Congress reignited politicization of the
Court by enacting the Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, intending to limit President Andrew
Johnson’s ability to appoint justices.98 This law reduced the Supreme Court’s size to seven
justices by prohibiting replacement appointments for the next three justices who retired.99
However, the Circuit Judges Act of 1869 restored the Court’s composition to nine justices.100
The Court’s size has not changed since 1869.101 Nonetheless, there have been attempts since
1869 to change its structure, with the most famous attempt being President Franklin
Roosevelt’s proposed court-packing scheme of 1937.102 Citing litigation delays, Roosevelt asked
Congress to grant him the authority to appoint an additional justice for each justice on the
Court who was over 70 years of age.103 Roosevelt actually sought to expand the size of the
Court because the Court’s conservative majority appeared to stand in the way of his New Deal
legislation.104
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Critics of the court-packing legislation argued that: the Court did not need more justices to keep
up with its caseload; the legislation would undermine the Court’s independence by violating
separation of powers principles; and the legislation would set a precedent that could one day
suppress both individual rights and the protection of minority groups.105 Further, the Senate
Judiciary Committee emphatically rejected Roosevelt’s Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary
bill, stating that it would “make this Government one of men rather than one of law, and its
practical operation would be to make the Constitution what the executive or legislative
branches of the Government choose to say it is—an interpretation to be changed with each
change of administration.”106 Despite the fervent opposition, many political observers expected
it to pass with ease.107
Ultimately, one of the conservative-leaning justices, Owen Roberts, began voting to uphold
New Deal legislation.108 Around the same time, another conservative-leaning justice, Willis Van
Devanter, announced his retirement from the bench.109 As a result, Roosevelt’s court-packing
legislation lost steam and failed to pass.110 Since the court-packing scheme, there have been no
significant attempts to alter the size of the Court.111
3. Proposed and Enacted Legislation Regarding the Federal Judiciary
Aside from legislation altering the Court’s size, a litany of proposed and enacted laws have
touched on other aspects of the Court’s functioning. For example, several laws have defined the
federal judiciary’s jurisdiction. Originally, the Court decided most civil appeals and had very
little control over managing its ever-increasing docket.112 The Judiciary Act of 1891 created
more jurisdictional organization among the federal courts by: creating nine new circuit courts;
reassigning the appeals that district courts would hear to circuit courts; establishing the
Supreme Court’s ability to review cases through certiorari; and eliminating the requirement
that Supreme Court justices engage in circuit riding.113 The Judiciary Act of 1925, which thenChief Justice Taft strongly supported, increased the Court’s discretion in selecting which cases it
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should hear with the underlying purpose of reducing the Court’s workload.114 In 1988, Congress
essentially eliminated all forms of mandatory jurisdiction for the Court.115
There are also several statutes pertaining to federal judges’ terms of employment. The Circuit
Judges Act of 1869 was the first law that instituted a pension-like provision, whereby Supreme
Court justices would retain their salary throughout retirement.116 In 1948, Congress enacted an
additional condition: a federal judge or Supreme Court justice must serve at least ten years
continuously on the bench to continue receiving his or her salary for life.117 Moreover, the same
1948 statute provides for the removal of a judge, and, consequently, the appointment of an
additional judge, if the president concurs with the Circuit Court’s Judicial Council:
that [the allegedly disabled] judge is unable to discharge efficiently all the duties of his office by
reason of permanent mental or physical disability and that the appointment of an additional
judge is necessary for the efficient dispatch of business, the President may make such
appointment by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Whenever any such additional
judge is appointed, the vacancy subsequently caused by the death, resignation, or retirement of
the disabled judge shall not be filled.118
The statute does not apply to Supreme Court justices.119 Although subsection (b) has never
been invoked by the Circuit Court’s Judicial Council,120 the language of the statute suggests that
it should only be invoked in extreme circumstances.

II. The Court’s Threatened Legitimacy in The Public’s
Perception
As the highest court in the United States, the Supreme Court represents much more than the
nine justices who occupy its bench at any given time—it embodies the American public’s idea of
a “citadel of justice.”121 However, public perception of procedures and actions surrounding the
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Court can dim the public’s confidence in the Court as an independent body.122 In this Part, we
explore certain realities about the Court that may threaten its reputable standing.

Inequity of Appointments
Because presidents nominate justices for the Supreme Court only when death or retirement
results in a vacancy, presidents have unequal opportunities to appoint justices.123 Inequity of
appointments by presidents may lead to uneven and unpredictable results, potentially allowing
presidents of one political party to appoint more justices than presidents of the other political
party.124 Given the frequency of 5-4 decisions and the importance of the cases that are often
decided by that margin, even one new appointment may be crucial to the Court’s judgments.125
When nominating justices, presidents tend to select a nominee with philosophical or ideological
views that mirror the president’s own.126 As a result, many senators, especially members of the
Judiciary Committee, emphasize the importance of closely evaluating the president’s nominees
before ultimately deciding who will serve on the bench.127
Although the nomination process does not guarantee presidents the same number of
appointments,128 the justices on the Court still tend to represent a diverse array of ideological

122

See generally id.
See BARRY J. MCMILLION & DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33225, SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS, 1789 TO
2017: ACTIONS BY THE SENATE, THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND THE PRESIDENT 4 (2018); see also Adam H. Morse & Julian E.
Yap, A Panel-Based Supreme Court, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 23, 28 (2011).
124
Morse & Yap, supra note 123, at 28.
125
DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31989, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT,
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE 6 (2010). The Court has issued increasingly more 5-4 decisions. In October Term
(OT) 2018, the Court issued 21 5-4 opinions, representing 29% of total decisions, and 81% of the 5-4 decisions were
split on ideological lines. In OT 2012, the Court split 5-4 in 23 out of 78 cases, which was again 29% of total
decisions, but 70% were split on ideological lines. Earlier terms saw fewer 5-4 decisions: OT 2011had 15 of 76 cases
(20%); OT 2010 had 16 of 80 cases (20%); OT 2007 had 12 of 69 cases (17%); and OT 2005 had 11 of 82 cases
(13%). While 5-4 decisions increased, unanimous judgments decreased. In OT18 the Court released 28 unanimous
judgments, representing 39% of its total decisions. Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019, 5:59 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/final-stat-pack-for-october-term2018/; Kedar Bhatia, October Term 2012 Summary Memo, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2013, 10:25 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/october-term-2012-summary-memo/.
126
RUTKUS, supra note 125, at 5.
127
Id.
128
President Franklin D. Roosevelt had the second-largest number of Supreme Court confirmations, with the
Senate confirming all nine of his nominations. In contrast, the Senate confirmed only one of President John Tyler’s
nine nominations. Six presidents achieved only one confirmation, and three presidents did not make any
nominations because no vacancies occurred during their presidencies. President Andrew Johnson made no
successful appointments because Congress eliminated the associate justice position to which Johnson had
nominated Henry Stanbery. MCMILLION & RUTKUS, supra note 123, at 5; Supreme Court Nominations (1789-Present),
U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Supreme Court Nominations].
123

16

Democracy Clinic

and philosophical views.129 Furthermore, legal precedent, accumulated wisdom, and methods
of interpretation influence the Court’s decision-making.130
If presidents of one party can appoint more justices than presidents of the other party, the
public might view the Court as an extension of the party that was able to make the most
appointments. One scholar observes that Republicans and Democrats “shared the presidency
fairly equally” from 1946 to 2001, with five Democrats controlling the White House for 26 years
and four Republicans holding it for 29 years.131 Yet, the Republican presidents made 15 of the
24 appointments to the Court during that time period.132 The scholar’s research further
suggests that of nine presidents during that 55-year period, the appointments of four affected
25 percent or more of Court decisions for the majority of that period.133 In addition to allowing
presidents of one party to have more of an impact on the Court, the randomness of Supreme
Court vacancies allows voters in one election to potentially have more influence over
appointments to the Court than voters in another election.134

The Nomination Process
Senate procedures can dilute the president’s power to nominate justices to the Supreme Court.
Although a nominee’s qualifications are central to the nomination process, extreme
partisanship has disfigured the Constitution’s vision of the process.135 One Congressional
Research Service report noted that the political aspect of the nomination process becomes
most visible when “a President submits a nominee with controversial views, there are sharp
partisan or ideological differences between the President and the Senate, or the outcome of
important constitutional issues before the Court is seen to be at stake.”136 The partisanship
afflicting the nomination process is due, in part, to changes to once-standard Senate practices
and rules.137
Another significant issue in the nomination process is the Senate majority leader’s power to
schedule votes on Supreme Court nominees. The majority leader may consult with the minority
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leader and other interested Senators before scheduling consideration of a nominee;138
however, Senate leadership ultimately has unilateral control over whether to allow a vote.139
If Senate leadership chooses to not schedule a nominee and takes no action, the full Senate will
be deprived of the opportunity to consider that particular nomination. For example, both the
Senate majority leader and the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee opted to take no action
on President Obama’s nomination of Judge Merrick B. Garland to fill the open seat created by
Justice Antonin Scalia’s death.140 They declined to hold hearings and a floor vote because they
asserted that a vacancy should not be filled in an election year, and that the next president
should fill the vacancy.141 When President Trump nominated Judge Neil M. Gorsuch to fill the
vacancy, the Judiciary Committee held confirmation hearings for four days, and “favorably
reported the nomination to the Senate” by an 11-9 vote.142 The full Senate held floor debate for
three days and confirmed Judge Gorsuch by a 54-45 vote.143
One scholar asserts that the Senate rejects or does not act on a nomination because of:
opposition to the president; opposition to the nominee’s politics or likelihood to hold positions
contrary to the party in power; pressure from interest groups; and fear that the nominee may
significantly change the Court’s ideological makeup.144 Another scholar argues that the timing
of the nomination, the Senate’s understanding of the nominee’s ideology, and how the
president manages the nomination process affect the Senate’s decision to reject or refuse to
consider a Supreme Court nominee.145
Senate voting records on Supreme Court nominees show how these phenomena have become
more widespread in the Court’s recent history.146 Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy
were confirmed unanimously in the late 1980s, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg received 96 of
99 votes at her 1993 confirmation.147 However, since 2006, no Supreme Court justice has
received more affirmative votes than Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s 68, a trend that shows how
Senators have gravitated towards voting along party lines as the country’s politics have become
more polarized.148
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Senate Votes on Recent Supreme Court Nominees

Source: Supreme Court Nominations (1789-Pressent), U.S. Senate,
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm
Notes:
* This is Chief Justice Rehnquist’s nomination to become chief justice. He was already a sitting associate justice.
** This was President Bush’s initial nomination of John Roberts to replace Justice O’Connor as an associate justice.
The nomination was later withdrawn to nominate Roberts to be chief justice.
*** This is Chief Justice Roberts’ nomination to be chief justice.

Allowing Strategic Considerations to Impact Retirement Decisions
While there are of course legitimate reasons justices retire, the Court’s legitimacy is impacted
when justices postpone their retirements strategically. Justice Nathan Clifford, who joined the
Court in 1858, served ably until his mental capacity began to decline around 1877.149 Clifford
then suffered a stroke in 1880 and Justice Samuel F. Miller, assessing Clifford’s mental
incapacity, termed him “a babbling idiot.”150 However, Justice Clifford delayed retirement
because he hoped that a Democrat would win reelection and appoint his successor.151
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In 1929, at the age of 72, Chief Justice William Howard Taft acknowledged that his mental
aptitude had declined, explaining that he was “older and slower and less acute and more
confused.”152 However, Taft too allowed political concerns to influence his retirement
decision.153 He worried about the appointment of radical judges to the Court, and felt that he
should postpone retirement “in order to prevent the Bolsheviki from getting control.”154

Ideological Predictability
In recent years, many justices now arrive at the Court with already-established judicialideologies.155 This is because presidents have been selecting their Supreme Court nominees
almost exclusively from the Courts of Appeals.156 The underlying strategy of selecting federal
appellate judges as Supreme Court nominees is to ensure some semblance of ideological
reliability.157 By selecting justices with a clear ideology, certain views may disproportionately
influence the Court and the greater legal community, even if those views represent a minority
outlook when a justice comes to the Court.158
Despite this strategy, several justices throughout history have appeared to depart from the
ideologies they held when they were appointed. Justice James McReynolds, who was appointed
by the Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, became one of the “four horsemen” who
threatened to completely derail Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal
legislation.159 Justice Harry Blackmun, whom Republican President Richard Nixon nominated,
became more liberal during his tenure and even authored the majority opinion in Roe v.
Wade.160 Justice Blackmun later defended the importance of the decision, which held that the
Constitution protects a woman’s right to obtain an abortion, and continued to vote to preserve
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the right to choose.161 This phenomenon of unexpected, ideological aisle-crossing has become
rarer.162
More predictable rulings indicates that presidents are nominating individuals who are more
ideologically consistent in their decision-making and less moderate in their ideology.163 In fact,
President George W. Bush’s appointees, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito,
have been described as “impeccably conservative.”164 Meanwhile, President Bill Clinton’s and
President Barack Obama’s appointees, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Elena
Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor, have maintained a liberal presence on the Court.165 With the
additions of Justices Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett, it seems to many
that the Court has a solidified conservative majority, renewing concerns of partisan imbalance
on hot-button issues for the foreseeable future.166 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts’
institutionalist inclinations to shield the Court’s independence from political capture may
reduce the likelihood that a definitive conservative majority has unilateral decision-making
authority on the Court.167 And Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh have recently shown signs of
independence on major issues before the Court.168

Set Majorities and Swing Justices
A Supreme Court with an odd number of justices permits the possibility of a clear ideological
majority.169 When the Court has operated with an even number of justices and no ideological
majority, compromise has been a necessity.170 The problem of a definitive majority is
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exacerbated by both the trend of justices serving longer tenures171 and the inherent inequities
in appointments that the system permits.172 These factors increase the likelihood that a justice
will remain on the Court long after the president with whom their views are likely aligned has
left office. They also allow a majority created over the course of perhaps a mere decade to
persist for generations.173 Ideologies can become entrenched, leading many to “question the
[C]ourt’s democratic legitimacy.”174
Furthermore, when the majority exists by only a slight margin and there is a justice who
occasionally decides with the minority, it might appear that the law is in the hands of one
justice.175 When a swing justice presides on the Court, litigators tend to tailor their legal
strategy to appeal to that particular justice, rather than the whole panel.176 To some, the
existence of a swing justice amplifies the perception that the Court’s decisions are
undemocratic and advances the view that the Court is more akin to the “rule of men,” rather
than the “rule of law.”177
Finally, there is a history of the Court overruling several major precedents following a justice’s
retirement, especially when that justice was a swing-voter.178 Commentators note that changes
in the Court’s membership can so easily alter precedent “undercuts the appearance that the
Court is doing law rather than enacting policy.”179

III. Analysis of Existing Proposals
Before detailing our recommendations, we analyze a bevy of existing proposals for reform
related to the Supreme Court that seek to protect the public’s perception of the Court’s
legitimacy; decrease ideological partisanship; and maintain the Court’s independence.

Methods of Implementing Reform
The authors of the proposals discussed here recommend different legal mechanisms for
implementing their proposals. Some advocate for a constitutional amendment,180 while others
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see amending the constitution as impractical and focus on reform via statute.181 The judiciary
possesses greater influence today than it did in its early days, leading some to argue that a
constitutional amendment, rather than a statute, would be better suited to address problems
affecting the judiciary.182 Conversely, because of the Court’s power and the country’s intense
political polarization, the passage of a constitutional amendment changing the Court’s
operating procedures seems unlikely.183

Term Limits
Term limits would confine justices’ service to a nonrenewable, fixed number of years.184 Many
proponents of terms limits, such as Fix the Court,185 have suggested 18-year terms,186 which
would enable each president to appoint a new justice every two years while keeping the Court’s
composition at nine.187 If a justice does not complete the 18-year tenure, a new appointee
would finish the remainder of the justice’s term without receiving an additional 18-year
term.188
One benefit of imposing 18-year term limits on justices, rather than granting lifetime tenure, is
that the president would appoint a new justice every two years. This regimented approach
would eliminate the problems posed by inequity of appointments.189 Term limits may
inadvertently avoid some physical or mental incapacity issues because justices would only serve
for a fixed term rather than for life.190
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However, others assert that term limits would weaken the Court’s independence. John D.
Feerick, former dean of Fordham University School of Law, highlights that the framers
understood lifetime tenure provided by the Constitution’s “good Behaviour” language as vital
to judicial independence.191 Alexander Hamilton stated, “[P]ermanency in office . . . may
therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in [the judiciary’s] constitution, and,
in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security.”192 Accordingly,
one disadvantage of term limits may be a weaker anchor for individual liberties, given that
judicial independence is “the right that anchors all other rights.”193
Moreover, Professors Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman contend that term limits would not
depoliticize the Court, but may exacerbate the problem.194 For one, they say the nomination
process would occur with increased frequency and equal ferocity.195 Such constant turnover
could erode the Court’s prestige.196 Additionally, shorter tenures may exacerbate what
Professors Lee Epstein and Eric Posner call the “loyalty effect,” which refers to “justices voting
in a way that favors the president who appointed them.”197 With every president nominating a
certain number of justices, presidents might be virtually guaranteed to have justices on the
Court who are predisposed to rule in their favor.
Next, term limits may also reduce collegiality on the bench. Justices who know they are working
together for the rest of their careers are more likely to cooperate with each other and may
expect reciprocation for concessions made in certain cases.198 Term limits, however, lead to
the “last period problem” whereby a justice approaching the end of his or her term will have
fewer incentives to collaborate with other justices and vice versa.199 Furthermore, term limits
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would inhibit the Court’s ability to build upon and gain invaluable insight from the accumulated
knowledge that lifetime tenure affords justices.200
Finally, limiting Supreme Court tenure to 18 years could require a constitutional amendment
because Article III’s “during good Behaviour” language indicates that federal judges have
lifetime appointments.201 However, some scholars argue that an amendment might not be
necessary if the term-limits reform moves justices to other courts after their terms expires.202

Mandatory Retirement
Some have called for a mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court justices.203 This suggestion
has roots in historical precedent dating back to colonial America.204 More than 30 states have
some form of a mandatory retirement age for judges serving on their highest courts.205 Setting
a retirement age would likely help maintain the Court’s legitimacy by reducing the likelihood
that justices with health issues would remain on the bench.206
However, this proposal does not come without weaknesses. While some justices’ energy for the
job might wane as they age, history shows that several Supreme Court justices have served ably
beyond their mid-70s.207 By mandating retirement at a certain age, the Court would be
deprived of senior justices’ capabilities and wisdom developed over decades of service.
Moreover, imposing a mandatory retirement age—and eliminating life tenure—would raise
many of the same issues as setting a fixed term limit.208 Finally, because Supreme Court justices
are authorized to hold their offices during “good behavior,” legislation forcing them to retire at
a certain age would raise constitutional objections.209
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Balanced Bench
Under the balanced bench proposal, the Supreme Court would increase its membership to 15
justices.210 Of the 15, ten justices would be explicitly partisan, with five identifying as
Democrats and five identifying as Republicans.211 The remaining five justices would be nonpartisans and serve non-renewable, one-year terms.212 The non-partisan justices would be
selected by the ten partisan justices two years in advance of their appointment.213 To be
selected, the non-partisan justices would need to garner at least supermajority support from
the partisan justices.214 Ideally, the partisan justices would select “colleagues who have a
reputation for fairness, independence, and centrism, and who have views that do not strictly
track partisan affiliation.”215 However, if the partisan justices fail to agree on a slate of nonpartisans, the Supreme Court would lack the requisite quorum for that one-year term,
preventing it from hearing any cases that year.216 Formulated by Professors Epps and
Sitaraman,217 the “balanced bench” was touted by Pete Buttigieg during his campaign for the
2020 Democratic presidential nomination.218
The original authors of the proposal highlight several advantages.219 First, it would increase the
likelihood that centrist candidates—who have almost no chance of being nominated in today’s
political climate—serve on the Court.220 Next, by regularizing a portion of the appointments,
the nomination process would be less partisan because the increase in appointments would
lower the stakes of each individual nomination.221 Furthermore, the authors contend that this
proposal would increase the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the American public for three
reasons: (1) it acknowledges the inherently political aspects of the Court and the justices; (2)
the presence of non-partisan justices would eliminate predictable outcomes based on party
affiliations; and (3) the presence of partisan justices would ensure that the best arguments
from all sides are discussed thoroughly during deliberations.222
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But partisanship could still have negative effects under the balanced bench proposal.223 For
example, the partisan justices could make compromises when selecting the non-partisan
justices that could lead to each side choosing justices who are at least amenable to their
ideologies.224 Prospective candidates for the non-partisan justice positions could also selfdeclare and re-register as independents only for the purpose of being appointed.225
Additionally, the balanced bench system would assuredly increase partisanship in the
nomination process for the lower federal courts, because those courts would be the source of
non-partisan nominees.226
Further, it would be problematic for the Court to cease functioning for a full term if an
agreement were not reached on whom to appoint as non-partisan justices. There are important
issues for the Court to resolve every term; it would be very disruptive to the legal system for
the Court to stop working for a year.
Aside from the practical concerns, there are also potential constitutional objections to the
proposal. Specifically, the president’s appointment power would be undermined because the
process would involve Supreme Court justices, instead of the president, choosing justices.227
However, Professors Epps and Sitaraman argue that justices inviting judges to sit on the bench
for a limited time is permissible within existing law and practice.228 For example, justices sit by
the chief justice’s designation on courts of appeals, and other lower court judges have flexibility
to sit by designation of chief judges on different circuit and district courts.229 Such movement
does not require additional presidential nominations and Senate confirmations.230
An additional constitutional concern with the proposal is that it could raise First Amendment
associational rights issues if the process only recognizes the major parties for the ten partisan
positions.231
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Rotating Panels
There are two versions of a “rotating panel” reform for the Court. The first, proposed by
Professors Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman, involves selecting Supreme Court justices from a
pool comprised of every federal circuit court judge. Scholars Adam Morse and Julian Yap
present a slightly different rotating panel framework that would provide for regularized
appointments to the Court.
1. Version 1: “Supreme Court Lottery”
The “Supreme Court Lottery” proposal involves randomly choosing a panel of nine from every
federal appellate judge across the country.232 Those chosen would serve two-week terms on a
panel as associate justices of the Supreme Court.233 A 6–3 supermajority would be required to
strike down federal laws.234
One benefit of this proposal is that it likely would result in cases being decided by justices with
a wider range of perspectives. Indeed, the Court would encompass a broader array of life
experiences and backgrounds.235 Additionally, the Court might become less inclined to strike
down federal laws.236 This increased deference could move the Court away from the center of
contentious political battles. A rotating panel of federal appellate judges could also encourage
narrower decision-making and more adherence to stare decisis because the justices would
know that a future panel might reverse radical departures from settled precedents and because
the circuit court judges sitting on the panel would be accustomed to following precedent from
their experience on inferior courts where they “operate under the threat of reversal.” 237
Epps and Sitaraman assert that a rotating panel of justices would de-politicize the Court.238 The
frequency of appointments would reduce the stakes and impact of each nomination, and
“contentious issues of public importance” would no longer be determined by the randomness
of unexpected deaths or strategically timed retirements.239 The Court would randomly assign
cases to panels and grant certiorari behind a “veil of ignorance,” where justices would be less
likely to base decisions on the predicted outcomes of cases.240 As a result, litigators would be
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less likely to bring ideologically motivated cases, and they would have difficulty catering their
arguments to specific justices.241
Another potential benefit of the rotating panel is that it would consist of relatively anonymous
justices.242 Reducing the celebrity of individual justices might lead the public to view the Court’s
administration of justice as impartial, rooted in legal principles, and less dependent on any one
individual.
A potential weakness of this proposal is that the possibility of litigants having future cases held
by panels that are more favorable to their arguments could encourage litigants to keep bringing
cases to the Court, resulting in less stability and uniformity in the law.
A rotating panel of justices raises some constitutional questions. First, it would involve judges
having dual appointments as federal circuit judges and as associate justices of the Supreme
Court.243 Epps and Sitaraman respond that the Constitution’s bans on dual appointments do not
explicitly apply to judges.244 They also cite historical support for dual appointments without
violating the Constitution, such as an order from the First Congress for justices to serve dual
positions and Chief Justice Earl Warren’s work chairing the commission that investigated
President John F. Kennedy’s assassination.245
Second, a rotating panel might run afoul of the Constitution’s vision for “one Supreme
Court.”246 Epps and Sitaraman contend that the language was the result of a compromise at the
Constitutional Convention in which the framers agreed to create a Supreme Court and let
Congress decide whether to create any lowers courts.247 They also cite Hamilton’s insight in
Federalist No. 22 that the core benefit of a single institution is its finality among the federal
courts.248 A Court with a rotating membership would retain this benefit.
Third, Congress may not have the constitutional authority to require a supermajority vote for
the Court to strike down federal laws.249 Epps and Sitaraman contend that there is no textual
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support for this objection, and that imposing a supermajority requirement is within Congress’s
authority to structure the federal courts.250
2. Version 2: Regularized Appointments
The other rotating panel proposal involves choosing members for a nine-person panel from an
expanded Supreme Court.251 Under Adam Morse and Julian Yap’s proposal, every president
would appoint three judges to the Supreme Court for each four-year presidential term they
served; this rate of appointments would result in an average of 15 justices on the Court at any
time.252 A random lottery would select each panel, and “the composition of the panel
considering each case would be announced shortly before oral argument.”253
The proposal seeks to “ameliorat[e] the problems associated with increased tenures”—justices
would no longer have to worry about retiring only when the president can appoint a likeminded successor because their retirements would not create vacancies.254 Additionally, the
presence of more justices would mitigate each individual justice’s impact, making it less likely
that justices would consider the direction of the Court’s jurisprudence in timing their
retirements.255 The panel-based system would also reduce each justice’s influence on litigants’
strategies. Because the composition of each panel would be announced just before oral
argument, “litigators would be unable to tailor their written arguments to specific justices.”256
While Morse and Yap’s panel-based system has significant merit, it encounters one major flaw
with its treatment of stare decisis.257 The authors maintain that each panel’s decisions would be
binding precedent on lower courts and “very strong but not binding precedent” on future
Supreme Court panels.258 While panel decisions would be entitled to stare decisis effect, “the
Court could not eliminate from panels the power to overrule prior Court decisions.”259 This may
lead to a lack of stability in the law. Although panels may hesitate to strike down decisions
issued by previous panels, the possibility remains that frequent decisions to overrule past
holdings would render the law unpredictable.
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Expanding the Court
Proposals to increase the number of justices on the Court have returned in recent years, mainly
from critics of Senate Republicans’ handling of nominations to the Court.260 Congress could
expand the Court by statute because the Constitution does not specify a number of justices.261
Congress has changed the Court’s size before.262 However, the nine-justice Court has been the
constitutional norm for over a century. President Franklin Roosevelt’s failure to expand and
reorganize the judiciary reinforced nine as the norm.263 Some scholars argue that adding
justices to the Court today would constitute a short-term, partisan solution, exacerbating
politicization of the Court.264

IV. Our Recommendations
We recommend three reforms to enhance the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the American
public: (1) a mechanism by which each president’s Supreme Court nominees would essentially
be guaranteed a Senate hearing; (2) a rotating panel framework that would regularize the
appointment process; (3) a new “senior status” position to allow justices to serve the Court in
an advisory capacity after they retire from deciding cases.

Securing a Senate Hearing
Our proposal mandates that the vice president, Senate majority leader, and Senate minority
leader vote on whether a Supreme Court nominee should receive a hearing. This would
practically guarantee the nominee a hearing and ensure serious consideration of the
president’s pick. The proposed process, which the Senate could implement through its rules, is
preferable to mandating a hearing because it would encourage communication between both
parties and prevent the unilateral imposition of the president’s will on the Senate.
Since the Twelfth Amendment’s enactment,265 the vice president has almost always been a
member of the president’s political party.266 And either the Senate majority leader and Senate
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minority leader belongs to the president’s party. Therefore, at least two of the triumvirate’s
three members would always be from the president’s party, virtually guaranteeing a president’s
Supreme Court nominee a hearing.
This guarantee is important. In modern times, the Senate has either moved nominees through
the appointment process quickly or not at all, depending on whether the majority leader and
president are from the same party.267 The proposed triumvirate framework would alter this
dynamic because presidential nominees would receive a hearing regardless of the Senate’s
composition. The triumvirate framework would promote both efficiency and inter-party
communication at the initial stages of the appointment process. Furthermore, it would embody
the framers’ vision for the appointment process. While the Senate would not be able to
completely restrain the president’s judicial appointment powers, it would still provide the
constitutionally-mandated advice and consent during the hearing and subsequent vote.
By ensuring that each nominee undergoes a Senate hearing, the proposed framework would
repair some of the partisan divisions currently crippling the federal government. A Senate
majority would no longer be able to stifle the presidential prerogative of filling vacancies on
federal courts—a tactic that has only increased the perception of the Supreme Court as
partisan.268 This would result in a more harmonious nomination and appointment process. If it
becomes conventional that, regardless of the Senate’s composition, every nominee receives a
hearing and a vote,269 the entire process will become less partisan. And the Senate might be
more likely to evaluate presidential nominees based on their merit rather than their political
values.270 Ultimately, by assuring presidential nominees a Senate hearing and then still giving
the Senate the opportunity to provide its advice and consent, the framework would allow the
executive and legislative branches to perform their roles as the framers contemplated.271
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Implementing a Rotating Panel Framework
We recommend that the Supreme Court adopt a panel-based system for hearing cases.272
Under this proposal, each president would appoint two justices to the Supreme Court for each
four-year presidential term that they serve. Appointments would no longer be tied to justices
retiring or passing. The Court’s membership would almost always consist of more than nine
justices, alleviating the need to quickly nominate and appoint justices in order to fill a seat.
Nine justices would still hear each case. Justices would receive their panel assignments via
lottery, and the composition of each panel would be revealed shortly before oral arguments.273
The lottery system for choosing which justices hear a given case would be similar to the lottery
systems that the federal circuit courts use. A panel’s ruling would be considered binding
precedent—with one caveat: to promote stability in the law, if a panel sought to overturn
Supreme Court precedent, or a majority of the non-sitting justices voted for further evaluation,
an en banc review of the decision would take place.
Although the president would be allowed two appointments per term, our plan would not
require that the president make any appointments. If the president did not make both
appointments during his or her term, these vacancies would remain unfilled—the president in
the following term (incumbent or not) would not be able to fill them, thereby barring any
president from appointing more than two justices to the Court during his or her four-year term.
Additionally, the president could not nominate justices until he or she has served six months in
office. This waiting period would encourage the president to seriously deliberate before making
any nominations for lifetime appointments. It would also maintain the Senate’s advisory role
and offer some regularity to the appointment process.
The Senate could still block the president’s nominees from ascending to the bench. However,
both the guarantee of every president having up to two appointments and the lack of rollover
vacancies would reduce the incentives to block a nominee. Further, our recommendation
would not limit how many nominees the president may put forth. If the Senate rejected one
nominee, the president could nominate someone new. Additionally, there would be no limits
on the president’s ability to withdraw a nominee. This system would strengthen the president’s
nominating power without detracting from the Senate’s crucial advisory role.274
Under our proposal, the chief justice would not hear every case—he or she would be subject to
the lottery system like the other justices. Requiring the chief justice to sit on every panel would
likely make the position unduly burdensome, especially in light of the chief justice’s
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administrative duties. We believe this proposal is constitutional because the Constitution is
largely silent on the details of the chief justice’s responsibilities.275 The senior most justice on
each panel would preside.
We also recommend changes to some of the Court’s procedural rules. First, we recommend
changing the method of granting certiorari. Currently, the Court requires that four justices vote
to accept a case for it to receive certiorari.276 However, with the larger, uncapped pool of
justices, settling on a particular number of justices to grant certiorari would be arbitrary.
Accordingly, the Court should grant certiorari when 45 percent of the entire pool of justices
vote to accept a case.277
Second, as mentioned, the Court should undertake en banc reviews of cases where a panel
sought to overturn legislation or Supreme Court precedent. In those case, the entire pool of
justices would hear the case. En banc review would help prevent the instability in the law that
could result from one panel easily overturning the holding of a previous panel without any sort
of review.
The final recommendation we offer in tandem to the rotating panel is a minimum-age
requirement for justices. A minimum-age requirement would make it less likely that the pool of
justices would become too large due to younger justices receiving lifetime appointments.
The panel-based system would strengthen the Court’s legitimacy. Equalizing appointment
opportunity would mean voters would effectively cast their ballots in presidential elections for
up to two Supreme Court nominees. Currently, appointment opportunities occur due to
chance, randomly awarding some presidents multiple seats to fill while giving other presidents
no opportunities to exercise their appointment power. Under the rotating panel framework,
the public would have more involvement and no president would disproportionately influence
the Court’s configuration.
Because a random lottery would determine the panels and presidents would be given two
nominations per term, the high and often contentious stakes of the nomination process would
be greatly diminished. Every time a seat opens up or the prospect of an open seat presents
itself under the current system, the president’s party clamors to fill it, mindful that it must seize
the rare opportunity to place a justice on the Court. Our proposal would not allow a justice’s
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passing or retirement to automatically trigger appointment procedures, which would make
justices feel less pressure to retire only when a like-minded president holds office.278
Senators who were not members of the president’s party would be less likely to stand firm
against the president’s nominees because they would know that a president from their party
would have opportunities to nominate justices. This could lead the Senate toward evaluating
nominees based on merit rather than political ideology.
Our proposed lottery system would likely change the way advocates presented their arguments
to the Court. During the Court’s recent history, certain justices became known as “swing
justices,” meaning they might vote with liberal or conservative justices, depending on the
case.279 As a result, litigators tailored their arguments with those justices in mind, knowing that
their chances of a favorable ruling were high if they could attain the pivotal swing vote(s). Using
the lottery system and revealing each panel’s configuration only shortly before oral arguments
would neutralize this advocacy tactic. Because advocates would not know the panel’s exact
composition far in advance, they would have to prepare their best arguments without
modifying them for any particular justice. The lottery, as a part of the panel-based system,
would protect the Court’s legitimacy by compelling advocates to make the most meritorious
arguments.
Our proposals are not without some potential weaknesses. Admittedly, rotating panels for each
case could potentially lead to instability in the law. For example, the panel system would not
further the judiciary’s legitimacy if, on the heels of a panel’s close decision regarding a
polarizing issue, the next panel to confront the issue reached the opposite conclusion in a close
decision. However, the potential for en banc review would dissuade panels from warring over
hotly contested issues. Further, the Court is unlikely to grant certiorari simply to alter
precedent. The Court is judicious and exacting during the process of evaluating petitions of
certiorari,280 and we would not expect this to change under the panel-based system. Last,
lifetime tenure has traditionally cultivated collegiality among the justices, and our framework
will continue to embrace this tradition by maintaining lifetime tenure. Accordingly, we believe it
is unlikely that our framework would cause the law to become any less stable.
The Constitution’s mandate that “the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court” could present a constitutional hurdle to implementing our proposed
framework.281 Commentators have argued both sides of this issue, but have not reached a
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consensus on whether Supreme Court justices hearing cases in panels would still be considered
“one Supreme Court.”282 An ultimate construal of the language’s meaning would determine
whether our proposal could be accomplished via statute or whether it would require an
amendment to the Constitution.

Retirement Stage
We recommend that Congress pass a law creating senior-status for Supreme Court justices.
Such a law would expand on an existing statute that permits retired justices to receive
assignments and designations from the chief justice to perform judicial duties in any federal
district or circuit court.283 Our recommendation would expand the role of senior-status justices
to include an advisory function where they could advise sitting justices on current matters
before the Court. This advisory system would allow the Court to retain the benefits that come
with the accumulated knowledge of experienced justices, while mitigating the likelihood that a
justice’s poor health or age could hinder their performance as an active justice.
Further, senior-status justices would maintain lifetime tenure, which would prevent certain
constitutional challenges and result in two incidental benefits. First, upholding lifetime tenure
safeguards the Court’s independence,284 as it eliminates the likelihood of justices re-entering
political life or working for private interests.285 Second, it will likely foster continued collegiality
amongst the pool of judges who would work together for life.

V. Conclusion
Maintaining the Supreme Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the American public is critical. It is
possible that the best course for achieving that goal involves less dramatic changes to the Court
than the reforms we suggest here. Nevertheless, we submit our recommendations with the
hope that they contribute to the ongoing dialogue around strengthening the nation’s
institutions.
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